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 Since the mid-nineties international financial integration has advanced gradually in 
the emerging areas of Asia, while it has progressed rapidly in Central and Eastern Europe. 
This process has helped provide long-term benefits for the economies of the two regions in 
terms of faster productivity growth and deepening of domestic financial markets. The strong 
surge of international capital inflows since the early years of the current decade has, 
however, also potentially increased the financial vulnerability and the external sources of 
contagion for a number of countries, particularly those in Central and Eastern Europe that 
have seen a significant increase in their foreign borrowing, and also those with still relatively 
underdeveloped financial systems. We thus analyze the risks of financial instability and asset 
bubbles in the emerging economies of the two regions, taking into account the degree of 
development of their domestic financial systems. We conclude by discussing possible policy 
responses to these challenges by the monetary authorities of the concerned countries. 
JEL Classification: F36, O16, O52, O53. 
Keywords: Asian economies, Central and Eastern European economies, capital markets, 
international financial integration. 
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 1.  Introduction 
Since the mid-nineties international financial integration has progressed not only in the 
developed areas but also in the emerging and developing areas, including in the countries of 
South-East Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. In the latter region the opening of the 
financial sector has been particularly rapid, in the context of convergence towards Economic 
and Monetary Union. 
  The present work recalls the process of financial integration for a sample of ten 
emerging economies of Asia 
1  and fourteen countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
2 Its 
structural features and concomitant developments in the domestic financial systems are 
analyzed, by singling out different patterns between and across the two regions. The final 
aim of the paper is to assess, on the one hand the long-term benefits in terms of the gradual 
development of the domestic financial systems, and on the other the potential risks of short-
term financial instability.  
Internationally comparable indicators of international financial openness (as measured 
by foreign direct investment, portfolio and banking investment) and the deepness of 
domestic financial systems (as measured by domestic banking credit, debt securities’ stocks 
and equity market capitalization) have been used to identify specific situations of financial 
vulnerability.
3 
Section 2 recalls the long-term evolution of international financial integration in the 
emerging countries of the two regions, assessing its benefits. Section 3 analyzes the last 
wave of international capital inflows to each of the two regions, assessing its consequences 
                                                 
1  China, Hong Kong S.A.R., India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,  Taiwan 
(Prov. of  China), and Thailand. 
2  Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, and Ukraine. 
3  In order to provide benchmarks for the two regions, similar indicators have also been computed for the 
group of the industrial countries in the Asian-Pacific region (Australia, Japan, and New Zealand) and for the 
euro area (excluding Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia).   6
in terms of greater financial vulnerability. Section 4 deals with the risks of financial 
instability and asset bubbles, taking into account the development of domestic financial 
systems in the various countries. Section 5 considers some policy options adopted to 
counteract the surge in capital inflows, and Section 6 concludes. 
2.  International financial integration in South-East Asia and Central and Eastern 
Europe: potential long-term benefits 
Emerging countries in South-East Asia (from now on, EME Asia) have traditionally 
taken a gradual and cautious approach towards international financial liberalization, with 
widespread controls on the capital transactions still in place.
4 Financial opening has 
proceeded with some ‘stop and go’: the ratio of gross foreign assets and liabilities to GDP, 
a standard indicator of an economy’s degree of de facto financial openness, after increasing 
from 135 per cent in 1990 to 182 per cent in 1999, fell back in subsequent years, due to the 
effects of financial crises and a temporary halt to capital account liberalization (fig. 1); 
5    
                                                 
4  By financial integration we mean an economy’s opening to international capital flows. Integration can 
be de iure, as it refers to the removal of administrative controls on the financial transactions of the balance of 
payments, or de facto, as it refers to the actual depth of international financial transactions or the importance of 
international assets and liabilities. In the note we mainly adopt the latter definition. 
International assets and liabilities (1)
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Source: Our calculations based on data from IMF, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti database, and national statistics.
(1) Sum of international asset and liability stocks; weigthed averages across countries.
Fig. 1  7
 
since 2003 the process has resumed, driven by booming capital inflows and outflows. 
Although financial openness still lags well behind real economic integration (as measured by 
international trade), it currently stands at 184 per cent of GDP for the whole of EME Asia, 
which is far above the value for Central and Eastern Europe.
 6 
In the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), the profound economic and 
political transformation that culminated in the admission (in May 2004 and in January 2007) 
of twelve new members to the EU has brought very rapid liberalization of the capital account 
and also more highly developed and integrated market infrastructures. Thus, for Central and 
Eastern Europe as a whole, gross foreign assets and liabilities as a percentage of GDP 
doubled between 1996 and 2006, from 75 to 154 per cent. Despite this rapid increase, 
international financial integration remains well below that of the euro area, which soared 
from 186 per cent at the outset of the euro in 1999 to 316 per cent in 2006.  
In both EME Asia and the CEECs, integration has been accompanied by progress in 
real economic convergence. In Asia, the empirical link between real per capita GDP growth 
and financial opening up appears quite blurred: a number of economies, including China,  
experienced only modest financial integration between 1996 and 2006, while achieving 
exceptionally high rates of economic growth (fig. 2a); excluding Singapore and Honk Kong, 
which are predominantly financial centers, the cross-country correlation between the 
increase in financial integration and per capita GDP growth in the region is rather weak 
(0.14). 
In Central and Eastern Europe, where the differential in per capita GDP growth vis-à-
vis countries in the euro area has been generally sizeable (above 2 percentage points per 
annum), the cross-country correlation between financial opening and economic growth is 
stronger (0.77; fig. 2b). 
                                                                                                                                                       
5  The indicator also includes official holdings of foreign exchange reserves and government debt held by 
foreigners. Thus, financial integration is not related exclusively to the private sector.  
6  Financial openness is, however, still quite low in some large countries (such as India, Indonesia, and 











































































































Emerging Asia: changes in international assets and liabilities versus real per capita GDP growth
 (2006-1996)
Fig. 2a
Source: Our calculations based on data from IMF, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti database, and national statistics.
Hong Kong (right scale)
Singapore (right scale)
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CEECs: changes in international assets and liabilities versus real per capita GDP growth
 (2006-1996)
Source: Our calculations based on data from IMF, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti database, and national statistics.
Fig. 2b  9
This evidence confirms that the empirical relationship between a country’s financial 
opening  and its rate of economic growth is not clear-cut. Research shows that this link is 
indeed very complex, and that financial openness may affect economic growth through 
different channels. Actually, the evidence is that in many cases improved access to funding 
for domestic investment has not been the main driver of accumulation; although financial 
openness should play an important role in countries with low domestic savings, there could 
be offsetting factors at play, such as exchange rate appreciation and volatility, which may 
deter domestic investment and the build-up of export capacity. 
7 
However, the benefits from international financial integration may require 
considerable time to be realized and they may work through indirect channels, the ‘collateral 
benefits’ as cited by Kose et al. (2006).
8 According to this view, financial integration 
operates mainly as a catalyst for the development of the domestic financial sector, and the 
adoption of structural reforms that improve macroeconomic stability (an anti-inflationary 
monetary policy) and strengthen the institutional framework (better governance standards for 
the corporate sector, and, more generally, protection and enforceability of investors’ rights). 
These indirect  rather than direct channels may explain why foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and also portfolio equity investment, which incorporate collateral benefits such as the 
transfer of technology and managerial expertise or enhance institutional development, tend 
to be correlated with stronger long-term economic performance. 
In both regions, international financial integration has been coupled with a significant 
deepening of domestic capital markets (figs. 3a-b). By taking together the outstanding 
stocks of domestic credit by banks, domestic debt securities and equity market capitalization, 
the total ‘size’ of the domestic capital market increased from about 140 to 300 per cent of 
GDP between 1996 and 2007 for EME Asia, and from about 60 to more than 150 per cent 
for the CEECs. Hence, although international financial integration has been faster in Europe 
                                                 
7  See D. Rodrik and A. Subramanian (March 2008) “Why Did Financial Globalization Disappoint?”, for a 
critical view of the benefits of financial openness in developing countries. 
8  M.A. Kose, E. Prasad, K. Rogoff and S. Wei (August 2006) “Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal”, 
IMF Working paper WP/06/189.    10
than in Asia, the strengthening of domestic capital markets has proceeded at a comparable 
pace.  
 















1996 2007 1996 2007 1996 2007
Total domestic credit (2) Domestic debt securities (3) Market capitalization
Emerging Asia: domestic capital market deepening (1)
(year-end amounts outstanding, as a percentage of GDP)
Source: Our calculations based on data from IMF and national statistics.
 (1) For 2007, June instead of December. - (2) As measured by banks' claims. The grid area represents credit to the public sector.  - (3) The grid area 
represents securities issued by the public sector. Securities issued by the private sector are obtained as the difference between total and securities 
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Total domestic credit (2) Domestic debt securities (3) Market capitalization (4)
CEECs: domestic capital market deepening (1)
(year-end amounts outstanding, as a percentage of GDP)
Source: our calculations based on data from IMF and national statistics.
 (1) For 2007, June instead of December. - (2) As measured by banks' claims. The grid area represents credit to the public sector. - (3) It includes 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and Turkey. The grid area represents securities issued by the public sector. Securities issued by 
the private sector are obtained as the difference between total and securities issued by the government sector. They include securities issued by 
financial institutions. - (4) For 1996, it includes Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Turkey. For 2007, it excludes Estonia. 
Fig. 3b  11
In order to reap the long-term benefits of international financial integration while 
containing the risk of short-term instability, authorities in some countries with still immature 
domestic financial markets and weak institutional settings have preferred to maintain 
selective capital controls on the more volatile types of international financial flows and delay 
further liberalization until their financial systems meet minimum development thresholds. 
This strategy, while protecting against the risk of short-term instability, could impose long-
term costs, both direct and indirect: capital controls are burdensome to administer for 
governments and tend to become less effective in the medium run; moreover, they distort the 
behavior of the private sector and the development of financial markets, as firms and 
investors adjust in order to evade them.  
3.  The surge of international capital flows to South-East Asia and the CEECs: 
potential financial vulnerabilities and external sources of contagion 
In the past five years world financial integration has been spurred by a surge of 
international capital inflows to emerging countries, which increased fivefold, to about 1,000 
billion US dollars, between 2002 and 2006; due to the exceptional expansion in the first half 
of 2007, they are estimated to have surged further last year, to 1,600 billion.
 9 
EME Asia and Central and Eastern Europe have received most of these resources: 
between 2002 and the first half of 2007 inflows increased about ninefold (to 897 billion US 
dollars on an annual basis) in the former region and more than sixfold (to 327 billion on an 
annual basis) in the latter. The intensity of foreign capital inflows relative to GDP in the 
period from 2003 to the first half of 2007 was quite exceptional in the CEECs (14.4 per cent 
on average), fuelled by expectations of further economic integration into core Europe. It has 
been relatively lower in EME Asia (8.6 per cent of GDP), a level that is comparable to that 
prevailing in the period 1992-97. 
The latest wave of capital flows to emerging countries (2003-07) has displayed a 
number of  remarkably positive structural features. First, a large part of the inflows has 
                                                 
9  IMF estimates.   12
accrued to the private sector, directly or indirectly through the intermediation of the banking 
system, while government foreign borrowing has diminished, as a result of improved fiscal 
positions and debt management. Second, FDI inflows, which had proven particularly 
resilient in the cyclical downturn of the late nineties, and also other equity investments have 
represented the dominant share of the inflows. Third, the cost and duration of foreign debt 
have been more favorable to the borrowing countries, compared to the previous wave of 
financial integration (1992-97).  
However, several elements of heterogeneity across areas and countries also stand out. 
The first difference regards the direction of net international financial flows: while the 
emerging countries as a group have become net capital exporters to the advanced countries 
(as opposed to the previous wave in 1992-97), the dispersion in their current account 
imbalances has increased. Several economies of EME Asia, all of them large manufactures 
exporters, have recorded persistent current account surpluses, while most CEECs have run 
large deficits (figg. 4a-b). The Asian current account surpluses, together with capital inflows, 
have exerted strong upward pressures on exchange rates, counteracted by official market 
intervention of unusual intensity. This different pattern across regions has carried 
implications for the allocation of financial resources to the tradable versus the non-tradable 
sectors, as relatively faster real exchange rate appreciation in Europe has brought about a 
more pronounced shift of resources towards the non-tradable sector than in Asia.   
Emerging Asia: net international capital inflows (2003-2007) (1)





















Net capital Inflows Current account balance Reserve assets
Source: Our calculations based on data from IMF (WEO database).





(right scale)  13
 
As a result of large and persistent current account imbalances, the standard indicators 
of external financial vulnerability have worsened during the current decade in a number of 
countries, particularly in Europe (fig. 5a-b).  
Between 2001 and 2006 the net international investment position (IIP) dipped further 
into negative territory in most CEECs, and it now exceeds 50 per cent of GDP in Hungary, 
Estonia, Latvia, the Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Turkey, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania. 
In EME Asia, instead, during the same period the IIP improved everywhere except Korea, 





                                                 
10  In the economies of Hong Kong, Taiwan (Prov. Of China), and Singapore net external assets have 
further increased from already high initial values; the IIP has turned positive in China (25 per cent of GDP in 
2006); the IIP is still negative (between 4 and 40 per cent of GDP) in Malaysia, India, the Philippines, 
Thailand, and Indonesia. 
CEECs: net international capital inflows (2003-2007) (1)


























Net capital Inflows Current account balance Reserve assets
Source: Our calculations based on data from IMF (WEO database).


























Emerging Asia: international investment position
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A second difference regards the composition of international capital inflows by 
instrument: while FDI has been a very important source of foreign financing for all emerging 
areas,
11 the strong rebound in external borrowing by the private sector (both banks and non-
banks) has been a prominent feature in Europe, and to a lesser extent, in some of the more 
advanced Asian economies, particularly Korea. According to data from the balance of 
payments, in Central and Eastern Europe the average share of debt was as large as 61 per 
cent of total capital flows between 2003 and the first half of 2007; the share is much lower 





                                                 
11  In both EME Asia and the CEECs, the average weight of FDI on total financial inflows between 2003 
and the first half of 2007 was slightly below 40 per cent. 
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FDI 
Emerging Asia: international capital inflows between 2003 and 2006 by type
(as a percentage of GDP)





Fig. 6a  16
 
 
According to international banking statistics, since 2001 the net external claims (the 
outstanding stocks of loan assets minus deposit liabilities) of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis 
most CEECs have increased significantly; 
13  on the contrary, BIS banks’ net claims vis-à-vis 
the economies of EME Asia have generally decreased during the same period (figs. 7a-b). 
14  
A third difference regards the growth of cross-border portfolio equity investment, 
which has been stronger in EME Asia: foreign net purchases of domestic equity securities 
amounted to over 20 per cent of total capital inflows from 2003 to 2006.
15 
                                                 
13  Turkey, Ukraine, and Cyprus being exceptions. 
14  Korea and China being exceptions. However, BIS banks’ net external claims are relatively modest (8.4 
per cent of GDP) vis-à-vis Korea and take negative values vis-à-vis China. 
15  This compares with a much lower figure (2.1 per cent of total capital inflows) for CEECs as a group in 
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FDI 
CEECs: international capital inflows between 2003 and the first half of 2007 by type
(as a percentage of GDP)
Source: Our calculations based on data from IMF and national statistics.
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Emerging Asia: external positions of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis banks and non-banks (1)(2) 
(year-end stocks, as a percentage of GDP)
Source: Our calculations based on data from BIS and IMF.
(1) Loans (Assets) - Deposits (Liabilities) of BIS reporting banks versus the selected economies. - (2) For 2007, June instead of 
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Source: Our calculations based on data from BIS and IMF.
(1) Loans (Assets) - Deposits (Liabilities) of BIS reporting banks versus the selected economies. - (2) For 2007, June instead of December.
CEECs: external positions of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis banks and non-banks (1)(2) 





Fig. 7b  18
When capital inflows grow too rapidly relative to the capacity of the domestic 
economy to absorb them, excess liquidity and credit boom conditions increase financial 
vulnerability. This entails a heightened risk of a sudden halt to international capital inflows. 
In the current juncture, a crucial issue is whether this possibility has also increased as a 
consequence of the global reassessment of risk. A recent Bank of Italy econometric analysis 
on a group of emerging countries (EMEs) has decomposed the variations in the yield spreads 
on sovereign bonds into two components, one capturing the role of ‘common external 
factors’ and the other that of ‘country-specific developments’. The results show that the 
rebound in yield spreads observed since last summer in the majority of EMEs is largely due 
to deteriorating global financial conditions, but the impact of this common external factor 
has varied depending on different domestic conditions (see Box 1: “Spreads on Emerging 
Market Sovereign Bonds and Global Financial Conditions”).
 16 
4.  Risks of financial instability and asset bubbles in South-East Asia and the CEECs 
4.1  Domestic bank credit 
The depth and diversity of domestic financial systems differ considerably across 
regions and countries, particularly in Asia.
17  Total domestic credit (banks’ claims) currently 
stands at 115.7 per cent of GDP in EME Asia (fig. 8a); however, it  tends to be much lower 
in the less advanced economies of the region, specifically in Indonesia, the Philippines, and, 
albeit to a less extent, India. Between end-2002 and mid-2007, domestic credit to the private 
sector increased at an average annual rate of 15.5 per cent (in nominal terms); its expansion 
has tended to be more rapid in economies with relatively low levels of financial 
                                                 
16  Yield spreads of EMEs’ sovereign bonds, after peaking in the aftermath of the Asian crises (to 1,631 
basis points on September 10, 1998), narrowed till mid-2007, to historically low levels (150 basis points on 
June the 1st, 2007). Since last July, they have begun rising again, reaching 339 basis points on March 3, 2008, 
and narrowing slightly, to 263 points, on June 5, 2008. 
17  For simplicity, we consider the ‘size’ of an economy’s domestic financial market (relative to GDP) and 
its degree of diversification across three pillars (banks’ credit to the domestic sector, outstanding domestic debt 
securities, market capitalization) as development indicators. However, these are only some of the relevant 
parameters for gauging a financial system’s development, as the institutional soundness and the efficiency of 
intermediation should also be taken into account.   19
intermediation, such as Indonesia and India, and with over-regulated and state-dominated 
systems (China).
18 Despite considerable progress during the current decade towards sounder 
banking systems, there remain weaknesses in the risk management practices of most 
financial institutions, and, in a number of countries, in the increased vulnerability of the 
banking system to changes in asset prices and returns. 
19 
Financial development in the CEECs has been relatively recent and mostly driven by 
banks. Between 1996 and 2007 the stock of total domestic credit expanded strongly in all 
countries, except for the Czech Republic (fig. 8b); thus, the share of total domestic credit in 
GDP has reached an average level of  62.5 per cent in mid-2007, compared with a much 
higher figure of almost 160 per cent in the euro area.
20  
Moreover, the role of foreign-owned banks, while remaining generally limited in Asia, 
has strengthened rapidly to become prevalent in the CEECs.
21  This has underpinned the 
rapid development of the domestic financial systems of the region and shaped their 
integration with those in core Europe. As foreign owners are generally large, well-capitalized 
and efficiently managed financial institutions, this has entailed not only an increase in the 
size of the domestic banking systems, but also significant improvements in their efficiency.  
In a number of CEECs, the rapid growth of domestic credit to the private sector 
recorded in the current decade has been financed through foreign borrowing rather than 
domestic savings.
22,23 Credit has been largely channeled to households, through mortgages 
and consumer credit, fuelling both private consumption and housing prices. 
24,25 
                                                 
18  Annual rates of nominal growth ranged from 4.6 per cent (Hong Kong) and 21.7 per cent (Indonesia). 
19  Based on ADB estimates (ADB, Asia Economic Monitor, December 2007), security investment (both 
debt and equity) represents nearly one third of total bank assets in Indonesia and the Philippines. 
20  Credit stock exceeds 140 per cent of GDP in Cyprus and Malta. Given the relatively low levels of per 
capita income in several countries, domestic credit appears to have reached relatively high values in Latvia, 
Estonia, Bulgaria and Ukraine, following its extraordinary expansion in the last few years.  
21  According to IMF staff estimates, foreign banks’ share of total bank assets in 2003 was above 95 per 
cent in Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, around 83 per cent in Hungary, and 67 per cent in 
Poland, Malta, and Bulgaria (for the latter country, figures are from BIS staff estimates for 2002). 
22  Between end-2002 and mid-2007 domestic credit to the private sector increased in nominal terms at an 








                                                                                                                                                       
23  For a more thorough analysis, see “Assessing risks to global financial stability”, Chapter 1 in: IMF, 
Global Financial Stability Report, October 2007. 
24  According to BIS estimates, at end-2007 the share of loans to households in outstanding total credit to 
the private sector was 50 per cent or more in Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, and Turkey; it was above 40 
per cent in Lithuania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. 
25  According to IMF staff estimates, between end-2003 and end-2006 real house prices more than tripled 
in Latvia and Ukraine, and more than doubled in Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria. Among Asian economies, 



































































































































































Emerging Asia: domestic credit to the public and private sectors (1)(2)
(end-year stocks, as a percentage of GDP)
Source: Our calculations based on data from IMF and national statistics.
(1) Credit to the private sector is obtained as the difference between total domestic credit (as measured by banks' claims) and credit to the public sector 






























































































































































































































Source: Our calculations based on data from IMF and national statistics.
(1) Credit to the private sector is obtained as the difference between total domestic credit (as measured by banks' claims) and credit to the public 
sector (grid area). - (2) For 2007, June instead of December. - (3) For 2007, March instead of June. - (4) For 2007, December 2006 instead of June. 
CEECs: domestic credit to the public and private sectors (1)(2)












The strong increase of competition in the domestic banking systems of Central and 
Eastern Europe has probably played a role; financial institutions have struggled to gain 
market shares and have adopted risk-taking strategies, in some cases jeopardizing lending 
standards. Also, foreign-owned financial institutions in some countries have provided a 
preferential funding channel for the local banking system. Although the rapid growth of total 
domestic credit has to be judged against the initial situation of severely underdeveloped 
domestic financial systems, it remains unclear whether it can be explained by economic 
fundamentals. 
4.2   Domestic debt securities 
Governments in Asia actively promoted the development of domestic bond markets 
after the 1997-98 crises in both the government and corporate sectors. The outstanding 
stocks of domestic debt securities issued by the private sector  exceed 50 per cent of GDP in 
Korea and Malaysia, and stand at around 20 per cent in Taiwan (Prov. of China), Singapore, 
Thailand, and Hong Kong (fig. 9a),
26 compared with 25.8 per cent in the industrial countries 
of the region.  However, problems of illiquidity and poor infrastructures in domestic markets 
for corporate bonds remain quite significant in a number of Asian economies.  
Although missing data do not allow a complete picture, domestic capital markets for 
debt securities remain generally quite underdeveloped in Central and Eastern Europe, 
particularly as regards issuance by the private sector (fig. 9b).
27  There is evidence that, at 
least in the very small countries, businesses have bypassed the domestic financial system, 
borrowing directly from foreign banks or issuing international bonds in foreign currency, 
thus leading to potential fragilities. Empirical evidence shows that the size of the economy 
                                                 
26  Data include issuance by financial institutions and refer to June 2007.  
27  Large public financing needs in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Turkey have led to 
the development of well established markets for government securities.   22
crucially influences the development of a local currency bond market, but stable 

















                                                 
28  See, for instance, “Financial stability and local currency bond markets”, BIS CGFS Paper No. 28, June 
2007; and also: A. Ciarlone, P. Piselli and G. Trebeschi (2006) “Demand and supply of local currency bonds in 
emerging markets: preliminary evidence from a new data set”, mimeo, Banca d’Italia, October 2006 







































































































































































Emerging Asia: domestic debt issued by the private and government sectors (1)(2)
(year-end stock, as a percentage of GDP)
Source: Our calculations based on data from BIS, IMF, and national statistics.
(1) Securities issued by the private sector are obtained as the difference between total issues and securities issued by the government 
sector (grid area); they include issues by financial institutions. - (2) For 2007, June instead of December. - (3) Weighted average for 
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Euro area Czech Republic Hungary Poland (3) Slovak Republic (3) Turkey
Source: Our calculations based on data from BIS, IMF, and national statistics.
(1) Securities issued by the private sector are obtained as the difference between total issues and securities issued by the government sector (grid area); 
they include issues by financial institutions. - (2) For 2007, June instead of December. - (3) Data for non-government issuers not avaliable. 
CEECs: domestic debt issued by the private and government sectors (1)(2)
(year-end stocks, as a percentage of GDP)
1999
Fig. 9b  23
4.3   Domestic equity   
Equity markets have expanded strongly in both regions since the beginning of the 
current decade, fuelled by sharp price rises. Last year market capitalization as a share of 
GDP reached 127.7 per cent in EME Asia, and 48.2 in the CEECs as a group (figs. 10a-b).
29  
In both regions, the expansion recorded over the past four years has been especially rapid in 
the largest and poorest countries.
30 Despite this notable increase in ‘size’, equity markets in 
both areas are still characterized by serious problems of illiquidity (judging from the low 
turnover) and high concentration on a few companies.
31   
In the context of illiquid and poorly regulated domestic equity markets, there is an 
issue of price overshooting, especially for those (mainly Asian) emerging economies that 
have attracted enormous inflows of portfolio equity investment. The evidence is scanty, 
however. A recent IMF survey, while pointing to a possible role of foreign investment 
(especially by hedge funds) in the volatility of domestic equity prices, does not find evidence 
of a significant, sustained effect on price levels.
32 Recent work at the Bank of Italy has 
attempted to analyze the relationship and direction of causality between equity capital 
inflows and stock market prices for a group of emerging countries. Though the results are 
still preliminary, they do not indicate any systematic link in either direction (see Box 2: 
“Financial Asset Prices and Emerging Market Capital Flows”). 
 
 
                                                 
29  This compares with 82.9 and 79.2 per cent of GDP for the euro area and the industrial countries of Asia, 
respectively. All figures refer to June 2007.  
30  Market capitalization growth between mid-2003 and mid-2007 was particularly strong in Ukraine, 
Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland, within Europe; and in India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and China, within 
Asia.  
31  According to IMF staff estimates for the CEECs, the turnover ratio (that is, the value of trading relative 
to market capitalization) in 2006 was well below that for the euro area in all countries, expect for the Czech 
Republic and Turkey.  
32  See “Assessing risks to global financial stability”, Chapter 1 in: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, 
October 2007.    24
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Source: Our calculations based on data from Bloomberg and Datastream.
































CEECs: domestic market capitalization (1)
(at year end, as a percentage of GDP)
Source: Our calculations based on data from Bloomberg and Datastream.
(1) For 2007, June instead of December. - (2) 1999 instead of 1996.
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5.  Policy options in countries experiencing large financial inflows 
Policy options may become particularly challenging under a rigid exchange rate 
regime, which not only limits the scope for monetary policy but may also encourage 
borrowing in foreign currency by inducing the private sector to underestimate exchange rate 
risk, as long as the regime is credible. The repercussions of a sudden reversal of capital 
flows are thus amplified by a possible collapse of the exchange rate regime. This is what 
happened in Asia following the outbreak of the 1997-98 crises. There is evidence that in 
some European countries the strong expansion in the liabilities of the private sector 
denominated in foreign currency over the last few years has been fed by the fixed exchange 
rate regime. In comparison with the Asian experience, however, banks with foreign currency 
liabilities have tended to transfer the exchange rate risk to their customers, by lending in 
foreign currency to households and firms; however, currency mismatches of the non-bank 
sector may easily translate into credit risk for banks, should a currency crisis occur.
33   
On the other hand, flexible exchange rates may also encourage speculative inflows of 
funds prompted by carry-trade strategies, especially in countries with relatively high 
domestic interest rates. For example, in some Asian economies (such as Korea, where there 
are limits to foreign borrowing by domestic financial institutions) firms have expanded their 
direct borrowing from abroad in low-yielding foreign currencies (such as the Japanese yen). 
Thus, no exchange rate system can really insulate a country from external shocks.
34  
In some countries, the authorities have tried to curb surging short-term capital inflows 
by means of capital controls on the balance of payments;
35  a number of Latin American and 
Asian economies have introduced such measures over the past two years. In general, the 
                                                 
33  See on this point, “Macroeconomic and financial stability challenges for acceding and candidate 
countries”, ECB Occasional Paper, No. 48, July 2006.  
34  According to IMF research, flexible exchange rates, together with sound macroeconomic conditions 
(low inflation and countercyclical fiscal policies) and long-term reforms of domestic financial systems, 
especially in the equity market segment, are the best policies to avoid disruptive booms and busts in a 
financially open economy. See: “The quality of domestic financial markets and capital inflows”, Chapter 3 in: 
IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, October 2007; “Managing large capital inflows”, Chapter 3 in: IMF, 
World Economic Outlook, October 2007.  
35  Also, more market-based measures have been used, such as taxes on international financial transactions 
or on currency deposits.    26
reintroduction of controls on capital inflows is not very effective beyond the very short term 
and may cause distortions because of efforts at circumvention. Controls on capital outflows 
are still very widespread in Asia; it has been suggested that the relaxation of restrictions on 
investment by residents could help counteract the effects on the side of foreign capital 
inflows.
36 However, past experience with the liberalization of capital outflows is that its 
effects are somewhat difficult to predict. 
In other cases, in order to contain the upward pressures on the exchange rate due to 
capital inflows, emerging countries have carried out (partially) sterilized intervention in the 
foreign exchange market. However, this policy has increasingly shown its limits, including 
in a number of Asian economies. Sterilization measures have in fact encountered increasing 
problems in implementation, and they have been only partially effective in reducing 
excessive domestic liquidity.
37 There is evidence that in a number of Asian economies 
(including China), the portion of unsterilized intervention increased significantly in the first 
half of 2007. Thus, policy makers in countries experiencing surges of capital inflows may 
have found themselves increasingly unable to insulate the domestic economy from these 
pressures, being instead in the uncomfortable position of having to choose between nominal 
exchange rate appreciation and higher inflation, and also facing possible domestic asset price 
bubbles. 
                                                 
36  A number of Asian countries (China, India, Korea, and Thailand) have loosened restrictions on some 
types of capital outflows since 2005. As a consequence, gross portfolio outflows have increased strongly in 
China and Korea, mainly reflecting purchases abroad by institutional investors and households, respectively.  
37  Sterilization has traditionally been implemented by raising the reserve requirement on banks or sales of 
government bonds to the commercial banks. However, as the scope for these measures has been gradually 
exhausted in recent years (reserve requirements act as a tax on banks and may distort financial intermediation) 
or their costs for the central bank have increased (in more liberalized financial systems the yields on long-term 
bonds can be relatively high), less conventional measures have been adopted, such as forward exchange market 
intervention (so that the central bank has to buy back the foreign currency at a later date) and central bank 
issues of securities of its own (usually low-yield short-term bills). However, as forward market intervention is 
temporary and holdings of central bank bills can be easily liquidated by banks and used to expand credit, those 
measures have also proved fairly ineffective in a number of cases.    27
6.  Conclusions and policy issues 
In the last ten years international financial integration, while advancing powerfully in 
Central and Eastern Europe, has progressed only gradually in the emerging areas of Asia. 
Although its effects are difficult to disentangle from other factors, financial integration has 
helped to sustain long-term economic growth in both regions, via deeper and more efficient 
domestic financial systems and faster productivity growth in the private sector. The 
technology transfer provided by FDIs has probably played an important role in boosting 
long-term productivity growth.  
Asian developing countries that have decided to delay financial liberalization have 
possibly renounced to a complementary tool in order to develop deeper and more efficient 
domestic financial systems. The maintenance of  controls on the capital account may in fact 
discourage and distort the development of the domestic financial sector: its long-term costs 
may therefore be carefully weighted against the short-term advantages of a more effective 
management of capital inflows.   
Since 2003 the process of financial integration has accelerated in both Asia and 
Europe, against the background of the strong rise of global capital flows to emerging 
countries. Both the intensity and the composition of the current wave of integration have 
differed across countries in the two regions, with external borrowing by the private sector 
having increased particularly strongly in Europe. When the growth of such capital inflows is 
very rapid, this may increase the short-term challenges for monetary authorities, in terms of 
looser control of domestic liquidity, more complex and less predictable monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms, and also a more significant role for the external sources of 
contagion. The latter risk has risen in the present juncture: even though the widening of the 
yield spreads of sovereign bonds since-mid 2007 has been largely  driven by the impact of 
worse external factors, it has nevertheless varied among emerging economies depending on 
specific domestic conditions.  
In Asia, the development and resilience of domestic financial systems appear to vary 
significantly. In the CEECs, the rapid growth of the banking systems has been spurred by 
close integration with core Europe; however, domestic capital markets tend to remain   28
relatively underdeveloped and undiversified. The risk of financial instability, arising from 
large-scale borrowing by the private sector, mainly in foreign currency, and possible asset 
bubbles is greater in underdeveloped financial systems.  
Policy choices may be particularly challenging under a rigid exchange rate regime, as 
the latter not only limits the scope for monetary policy but also tends to encourage 
borrowing in foreign currency. In presence of strong and surging capital inflows, some 
emerging countries (both in Latin America and Asia) have reintroduced controls on the 
capital account, but these measures tend to be ineffective beyond the very short term. Several 
countries have instead resorted to sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange market. 
However, this policy has increasingly shown its limits in the most recent years, including in 





Spreads on Emerging Market Sovereign Bonds and Global Financial Conditions 
38 
In the empirical literature two sets of factors are seen as influencing the movements in 
the yield spreads on EMEs’ sovereign bonds: conditions in global financial markets 
(common factors) and individual EMEs’ macroeconomic fundamentals (country-specific 
factors). Factor analysis conducted on a large sample of EMEs’ sovereign spreads over a 10-
year period (January 1998-February 2008) shows that a single common factor, which can be 
traced back to international investors’ risk aversion as captured by volatility in mature stock 
markets, explains a significant part of the yield spread co-variation. We then include the 
common factor in country-by-country estimations, controlling for a set of country-specific 
macroeconomic fundamentals.39 
The Chart summarizes the main results. It shows the overall change in spreads (as 
represented by the bars) and how much of it can be attributed to changes in the common 
factor (as represented by the dots). Two sub-periods are considered: the first (from January 
2003 to June 2007) refers to a period characterized by ample liquidity and historically low 
levels of risk aversion; the second (from August 2007 to February 2008) refers to the more 
recent period of financial market stress. The closer the dot is to the edge of the bar in the 




                                                 
38  Extract from Alessio Ciarlone, Paolo Piselli, and Giorgio Trebeschi (June 2008), “Emerging markets’ 
spreads during the recent financial turmoil”, mimeo, Banca d’Italia. 
39  By means of the fully-modified OLS (FM-OLS) procedure (Phillips and Hansen, 1990), we estimate the 
long-run relationship that links a given country’s yield spread to both its ‘country-specific fundamentals’ and 
the ‘common factor’ component. Technical details can be found in A. Ciarlone, P. Piselli and G. Trebeschi 
(2007), “Emerging Markets’ Spreads and Global Financial Conditions”, Temi di Discussione 637, Banca 
d’Italia, June. The set of macroeconomic variables that were included (and proved to be significant) in the 
country-by-country regressions were the exchange rate, the ratio of current account balance to GDP, the ratio of 
government budget balance to GDP, real GDP growth rate, the ratio of gross external debt to exports, the ratio 
of short-term debt to total external debt, the ratio of government debt to GDP, openness to trade, the ratio of 
international reserves to total external debt, inflation rate, and interest rate.   
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Note: On the vertical axis, numbers indicate the ratio of the spread at the end of the period to the spread at the beginning of the period. 
Thus, the bars show the log difference in spreads incurred in the indicated interval. The dots show the difference in spreads that can be 
attributed to changes in the common factor.  
 
It turns out that the generalized widening of yield differentials since end-July 2007 is 
to be traced back, to a large extent, to the worsening global financial conditions, i.e. the 
increased volatility in stock markets and the increasing risk aversion of international 
investors. In fact, on average, about 80 per cent of the observed changes in EMEs’ spreads is 
due to the change in the ‘common factor’.
40 
In some cases (Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Russia and Turkey) the adverse 
influence of the common component in the most recent period would have warranted a larger 
increase in spreads than that actually observed (as shown by the fact that the dot lies outside 
                                                 
40  What is not accounted for by the ‘common factor’ is due to the country-specific variables and the 
residuals in the regressions (to the extent that the common component is correctly specified, the residual can be 
thought of as a sort of omitted country-specific factor). As the influence of the ‘common factor’ on yield 
spreads may be exerted not only directly but also indirectly, via changes in the ‘country-specific’ fundamentals, 
we tend to capture only the direct effect of the ‘common factor’ on each country (via its parameter coefficient 














































































































































































Widening spreads: July 2007 - February 2008










the bar). This is evidence that in these countries macroeconomic fundamentals have 
improved over this period, thus limiting the change in spreads. Instead, in most cases, the 
residual contribution stemming from country-specific developments has also been 
unfavourable, amplifying the adverse impact of worsening global financial conditions. This 
is particularly the case for some European countries (Romania and Lithuania). Overall, the 
analysis shows that it might be misleading to assume a financial ‘decoupling’ from 
developments in mature markets:  EMEs, in fact, do remain vulnerable to sudden shifts in 
international financial conditions (particularly so, Slovakia and Latvia); moreover, for some 





Financial Asset Prices and Emerging Market Capital Flows  
41 
Equity investment inflows to emerging market economies were at a record level in 
2007, and equity prices have been soaring since 2002: is there a causal relationship between 
the two and what is its direction? A first, rough examination of the issue involved 
computing, for a sample of emerging countries over the period between 2002 and 2007, 
simple measures of contemporaneous linear correlation between monthly equity inflows (net 
foreign purchases by U.S. residents of domestic equity securities scaled by domestic market 
capitalization) and monthly equity returns.
 42,43 We find a positive and significant correlation 
only for 2 out of the 20 countries in the sample; in both cases, inflows are well above 2 per 
cent of domestic market capitalization, which we may consider a “minimum threshold” 
effect at play, especially in small markets (see figure).  
 
Applying more refined econometric techniques to the analysis, the results are not free 
from problems. Under the efficient-market hypothesis, financial asset prices fully reflect 
only fundamentals and there would be no scope for any additional, independent role of 
international capital flows. However, as in reality investors are not unboundedly rational and 
markets are scarcely perfect, empirical studies have suggested otherwise, unveiling 
anomalies in the functioning of financial markets. A first strand of literature has assumed 
international barriers to market integration and found that inflows and capital account 
                                                 
41  Extract from Francesco Lovecchio and Sergio Santoro (July 2008), “International Capital Flows and 
Equity Prices in Emerging Markets”, mimeo, Banca d’Italia.     
42  Countries in the sample are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, China, Indonesia, South 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, India, Czech Republic, Hungary, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, South 
Africa, and Turkey. 
43  As an indicator of foreign purchases we take cross-border equity portfolio purchases by U.S. residents 
as reported through the Treasury International Capital (TIC) system. Monthly returns on equities are calculated 




liberalization do cause equity prices to soar;
44 however, during periods of international 
financial integration a wide array of domestic policy reforms are typically implemented, so it 
may be difficult to disentangle the influence of international capital flows from that of policy 
shifts. Other studies, which find supporting evidence for causality in the opposite direction, 
that is, from prices to capital flows, assume that foreign investors tend to be “return chasers”, 
as they engage in “positive feedback” trading strategies, buying when prices are going up 
and selling when prices are going down;
45 this thesis view may entail a destabilizing role for 
capital flows, which may drive prices further from their equilibrium value. Overall, the 
empirical results are hardly conclusive, and the existence of a causal link remains quite 
uncertain. Moreover, this issue has commonly been investigated through vector 
autoregressive (VAR) models, in which the problem of endogeneity is extremely severe and 
the identification procedure rests on assumptions that heavily influence the results.  
 
In order to overcome the endogeneity problem between flows and returns, we have 
applied a new approach for the identification of the structural parameters in a VAR model 
with less restrictive conditions.
46, 47 According to preliminary results, no causality in either 
direction is found: there is no robust evidence of a direct contemporaneous effect on returns 
of a shock to inflows, or vice-versa; however, a caveat is in order, as for most countries 
parameter estimates are poor, with a high degree of uncertainty. Thus, it would be premature 
to rule out the possibility of some causal relationship between equity flows and returns. 
                                                 
44  M. Dahlquist and G. Robertsson (2004), “A note on foreigner’s trading and price effects across firms”, 
Journal of Banking and Finance; A. Richards (2005), “Big fish in small ponds: The trading behavior and price 
impact of foreign investors in Asian emerging equity markets”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 
45  G. Bekaert and C. R. Harvey (2000), “Foreign Speculators and Emerging Equity Markets”, Journal of 
Finance; P. B. Henry (2000), “Stock Market Liberalization, Economic Reform, and Emerging Market Equity 
Prices”, Journal of Finance. 
46  See R. Rigobon (2003) “Identification through heteroskedasticity”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 
for more details on this approach.
 This estimator allows us to get around the identification problem simply by 
exploiting the presence of sub-samples characterized by different volatilities. In our estimation period, from 
January 1995 to December 2007, sample countries experienced several episodes of financial turmoil, like the 
Asian and Russian crises, and the default of Argentina; this provides us with the necessary shifts in volatility to 
apply this methodology. 
47  We have estimated a simple bivariate VAR model for each of the 20 countries of our sample between 
monthly purchases of equities and monthly returns on equities from January 1995 to December 2007, when 
capital account liberalization had already occurred in most emerging economies.  
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Instead, our results call for further investigation, possibly through even more complex 
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